Generally, attempts to avoid Cartesian dualism relating brain and mind arguably lead to epiphenomenalism or strict materialism, in part because the problem is that these explanations have predominantly focused upon the efficient causal relationship between the physical and the phenomenal. Elucidating the efficient cause of consciousness is the essence of what Chalmers (1995) referred to as neuroscience's "hard problem." This has not been sufficiently addressed, mostly because of the apparent degree of complexity in the systems that comprise brainmind, compared with the complexity of cognitive constructs used to describe, explain, and account for them. This paper will posit the significance of the problems inherent to complexity that impact the "hard problem" of explaining consciousness, as well as attempt to illustrate similar, analogous problems in physics, and demonstrate how conceptions of causality can be alternatively applied to overcome these explanatory obstacles. By reconsidering the relationships between explanation and the explanandum, it may be that the whole system needs to be considered when positing an explanation at any level, and particularly so when considering formal cause. By emphasizing formal causality over efficient causality, an epistemological solution is suggested that has broad implications for both brain-mind and physics, and we posit that this solution could apply to other explanatory problems in science.
Introduction

1
The obstacles that challenge an understanding of neurobiological consciousness are generally approached in one of two ways, depending upon professional orientation: explaining consciousness is 1) generally approached as a technical problem or 2) a philosophical problem. Explaining consciousness (hereafter referred to as problems of "brain-mind") may be viewed as a technical challenge by those who believe that an explanation of the entirety will arise from sufficient explanation of mechanics of its physical components and/or substrate, (i.e., neural function in the brain) (Dennett, 1991; Churchland, 1986) . Philosophers tend to explain consciousness as a "hard problem" as relates to the difficulty of evoking (presumably) nonmaterial phenomena (i.e. conscious experience, the sense of "what it is like to be") from a material substrate (Chalmers, 1995; Nagel, 1974) . In reality, however, these approaches are reciprocal, if not theoretically inextricable. On closer examination, it becomes clear that the central challenge to both material and philosophical neuroscientific understandings of consciousness is contingent upon epistemological issues regarding complexity.
Epistemological frameworks influence (and limit) explanations (partly) through the employment of concepts of causality. A substantial volume of literature has explored the relationship between epistemological concepts of causality and processes of consciousness, physics, or scientific progress in general (see: Kafatos and Nadeau, 1990; Corbí and Prades, 2000; Churchland, 1986; McGinn, 2004; Kelso 1999; Walker, 2000) . Viewing the intractability of the brain-mind problem as a problem of causality (i.e., how can brain make mind) implicates a broader epistemology that encompasses not only neuroscience, but physics as well.
The aims of science are to arrive at explanations for phenomena as consistent with a "natural philosophy," presupposing that science is, by definition, in some way physical (Falcon, 2008) . Accordingly, the science most often invoked as representing this fundamental reality is physics. Yet the relationship between physics and other sciences is complex, in the sense that it appears to represent a hierarchy wherein each level has phenomena for which explanations at lower levels are inapplicable in scale and "meaning" (e.g., describing canine digestion in terms of atoms) (Crawford, 1998) . Also, not only is complexity manifest in relationships between the sciences (as discussed later), but it is also present in phenomena within each science (Rauscher, 1998) . For example, classical physics somehow arose from quantum mechanics; however, classical phenomena cannot be described in terms of quantum mechanics (as yet) because this transition is not fully understood. Even if it were, it is worth asking what relevance quantum phenomena have (at least in the universe's present state) to the motion of celestial bodies. This is reminiscent of discussions regarding whether neuronal functions and psychological constructs (qua mental abstractions) may be relevantly described by the same science (Brown, 2003) . Yet, for discussions of brain-mind, subjective experience is (a psychological construct that is) obviously relevant to neural dynamics, even if the efficient cause remains unknown. How can the physical possibly cause the phenomenal (or vice versa)? Assuming they cannot, one has two choices for constructing an explanation: 1) deny the existence one of them (the physical or the phenomenal) so that there can be a single explanatory framework, or 2) redefine what is to be explained (i.e., the explanandum) such that the physical and the phenomenal are the same thing (without denying either; viz.,-preserve the phenomenon.)
When causes and effects are reciprocally related in mechanistic explanation, the concept of cause (as necessary and sufficient for effect) becomes useless, (as it arguably is in quantum physics). Complexity provides a framework to describe why such causal mechanisms for relating brain and mind are so elusive. Complexity should be distinguished from the term complicated, which refers to "a large system consisting of very many components, subsystems, degrees of freedom, and so on..." (Crutchfield, 2008, p.273) . Complex systems can be defined in different ways, depending on whether the considered mode of complexity is epistemic, ontological, or functional. For this discussion it will be distinguished from a "complicated" system by the presence of structure reflecting both regularity and the intrinsic emergence of patterns (i.e., patterns whose novelty exists only by reference from within the system). Inherent to the concept of complexity is an organizational or operational elaborateness of the interrelational structure of constituent elements (Rescher, 1998) . (Note that complicated systems are not necessarily complex because they may lack identifiably interrelated constituent elements, leaving the dynamics accounted for entirely by randomness (Crutchfield, 2008, p.273) .
To some extent, "any system or process-anything that is a structure's whole consisting of interrelated parts" will exhibit complexity. Moreover, complex systems exhibit other traits that may be traced back to its interrelating components. In many cases, this interrelation among constituent elements allows for the emergence of new properties (i.e., new functional or descriptive features which cannot be ontologically reduced to their constituents). According to Crutchfield (2008) , "…a process undergoes emergence if at some time the architecture of information processing has changed in such a way that a distinct and more powerful level of intrinsic computation has appeared that was not present in earlier conditions." In hierarchical complexity, this latter condition of a more powerful "level" of intrinsic computation can be thought of as being higher in a complex hierarchy. More important is that it "ascends" to this higher level through the internal relationship(s) of parts at the (next) lower level. In this way, the structural interrelationships represent the organization of this emergent information processing, and is known as intrinsic emergence (Crutchfield, 2008) .
Complexity and emergence have meaningful implications for the structure of mechanistic explanation. The discovery of emergent properties does not occur, so much as being detected by observation. For example, chaotic unpredictability arises from a completely deterministic function; unpredictability is not apparent from the perspective within the system.
Rather, this novel property (unpredictability) is captured by an observer; it is not deduced. It is this "closure of 'newness' evaluation [that] pushes the observer inside the system" (Crutchfield, 2008, p.272) .
Applying this to the brain-mind "problem," the consciousness (and mental constructs) that are to be explained become a part of the explanandum, inducing an "internal reference of the interrelated parts" that signify a complex system. Generally, pattern formations in complex systems are explained by models, which, more than being "explicit representation[s]" of systems, are also implicit "in the dynamics and behavior of the process[es]" (Crutchfield, 2008, p.272) . The explanation (the model) and the explandum (the system or process itself) are parts of a common system in which the model is embedded in the system, requiring "excavation" (p.272). Excavation such as the detection of novelty (e.g., a pattern) in a complex system is reflective of, or analogous to, a conscious process in the detecting observer (or is a cognitive construct manufactured by the same). As an explanation, the [complete] model will reflect the complexity of the explanandum, which-even as a cognitive construct-is complex to the point of [explanatory] irreducibility. This prompts the question of whether such a complex explanation for emergence has relevance for issues of complex and emergent phenomena? We posit that the answer depends on the complexity of the questions themselves.
If an "explanatory gap" exists between levels of a complex hierarchy of brain-mind, then mental constructs used to describe the brain are nonsensical (i.e., cannot address phenomena) at a level where the causes of brain and mind reference each other. The causes of brain and mind may be reciprocally referent at the level of "emergent" consciousness (if neuronal mechanisms are conceived as a complex hierarchy wherein conscious processing emerges and then influences neuronal dynamics in a "top-down" fashion (Juarrero,1999 ). Yet, defining causal mechanisms for processes that dynamically occur across a complex system is different from defining causal mechanisms that are limited to a single level of hierarchical complexity. This is because the explanation, to match the complexity of the explanandum, must utilize a more complex (kind of) causality.
According to Aristotle, students of natural science apply "why-question[s]" of effectual phenomena to the four types of causes that underlie them, (namely the final, formal, efficient, and material causes-or "that for the sake of which [something is done]," "the form of 'what is to be ' [done] ," "the primary source of change or rest [of something done]", and "that out of which [something is done]", respectively) (Falcon, 2008 (Falcon, 2008) . If the explanation sought in answer to a "whyquestion" is limited to a single type of cause, then the explanation will necessarily be less complex than an explanation that would address all four causes.
Therefore, if the material cause of consciousness is sought such that the (neuronal) substrate of consciousness is presupposed, then identifying the cause of consciousness as the material brain would be accurate and reasonably complete. However, when an efficient causal mechanism is also sought, for example by asking "how do changes in the material brain result in mind," then causal convergence is presupposed in that it is impossible to answer such a question without considering "out of what?" "for what purpose?" (i.e., the material and final causes) and "what form [does the mind take]?" (i.e., the formal cause). If an explanation for consciousness is sought to account for 1) the involvement of neuronal substrates (i.e., material cause), 2) the phenomena of mind and/or qualia (i.e., final cause), 3) the selforganizing top-down and bottom-up associational mechanisms that characterize neural activity (i.e., formal cause), and 4) the mechanism by which consciousness arises from the substrate processes (i.e., efficient cause), then each cause will necessarily reference the others, making the explanation reference the explanandum itself (e.g., the system or process). In a complex system with causal convergence, the formal cause of consciousness (and perhaps the final cause as well) is emergent from the material and efficient causes. Because this selfreference indicates a complex hierarchy, any completely causal explanation is likely to be as complex as the reality of the explanandum, and therefore is difficult to impart as anything other than a complete whole. If the question pertains to a part of the system, then a level of complexity will necessarily be omitted from the explanation.
We can now see that the "hard problem" of consciousness exists because it seeks an efficient causal explanation for something in which efficient mechanism is inextricable from its form, substance, and even more importantly, its final purpose-the ability to detect the patterns that are desired to be efficiently explained in the first place. By analyzing the inevitable 'causal convergence' in complex systems, we can identify certain requirements for conceptions of causality that any sufficiently complex explanation must reflect. These requirements apply not only to explanations for consciousness, but also other areas of science, wherein explanations confront and reflect similar tensions between dualism and reductionism (such as the quest to explain classical physics in terms of quantum mechanics). Yet there seems to be a paradox, because when the complexity of the explanation is sufficient, it no longer seems to have any capacity to distinguish simple relationships between material, efficient, formal, and final causes. In other words, at a high level of complexity these are as converging in the explanation as in the phenomena themselves.
Relating Neuroscience to Physics
Given the complex interrelation between levels of causality, a more cogent philosophical approach that relates brain to mind as grounded in a formal, as opposed to efficient, causality can be expanded to examine the system as a whole. Interrelationships such as those of brain and mind may become apparent even if no efficient causal interaction between them can be defined within the system. Portrayals of formal causality (of interrelationships) often span various levels of complexity, and the view from "outside" a system often entails relating fields of knowledge whose interrelationships exhibit hierarchical complexity as well.
According to Rescher (1998) , "…reality's systemic structure means that every field of knowledge is surrounded by others." The phenomena within different fields may not causally interact, but they nevertheless interrelate. Analogies between these fields and their processes, as evident in higher-order studies, permit comparisons and contrasts of ontologically diverse phenomena and can illuminate issues that do not exist upon more restricted inquiry, and/or if considered in isolation (Rescher, 1998) . Such higher-order study broadens the cognitive complexity of description, account, and explanation, so that it may approach the functional and structural complexity of the explanandum, in this case, the (processes of) brain-mind.
Portrayals of complexity that are sustained through considering formal causality might not directly close the explanatory gap between (i.e., efficient causal relationship of) the brain and mind. However, it may allow a more integrative an understanding of brain-mind by considering the formal properties of reality as a whole. To focus upon an understanding of brainmind, the properties of (the system's) reality must ultimately encompass physics. This is not to say that sufficient understanding of efficient physical mechanisms of the brain will necessarily explain "mind." Causal ambiguities can often lead to conclusions resembling varying degrees of dualism of brain-mind, and these also occur of physics. To reiterate, physics portrays causalities at the classical level differently than those at the quantum level. So while it is "trendy" to explain consciousness solely in terms of quantum physics, it is important to recall that causality in quantum physics does not necessarily resemble that which is described in classical terms. Therefore, if studies of quantum physics and consciousness are to become theoretically combined so as to address mutual properties, then the issue of different causalities must be resolved, or at least be sufficiently addressed so as to regard and acknowledge the causal ambiguities present in both disciplines.
It may be that quantum physics was so slow to be accepted, despite its practical success, because of a causal ambiguity it presents. It has been referred to as physics' "skeleton in the closet" that quantum physics seems to inevitably encounter consciousness by the implications of its assertion that atoms or elementary particles are merely "potentialities or possibilities" (i.e., an immaterial wave function) until measured or "observed" (although consciousness may be more or less directly encountered depending on the definition of such an "observation") (Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2006) . Measurements are said to "collapse" the waveform (also referred to as the "de-coherence" of a superposition state wave function), meaning that while both states exist at the macroscopic level, after measurement only one is "actualized" (i.e., observed) from the macroscopic perspective. In order to avoid this "quantum enigma" (so coined by Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2006) various interpretations are applied to mitigate the eventual involvement of consciousness in the principle of observation, which yields a worldview that is in direct contradiction with the classical assumption of a "physical" world as "physical" is typically defined (Hooker, 1972; Kafatos and Nadeau, 1990, p.79) .
(In their discussion of the "quantum enigma," Rosenblum and Kuttner refer to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of "physical" as "Of or pertaining to the material Nature, as opposed to the psychical, mental, or spiritual".) While many different interpretations of what constitutes such an observation have varying success at distancing consciousness from the measurement or observation of "collapsed" reality, none at present entirely escape it (Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2006) . Consciousness has some causal interaction with quantum physics. This inclusion of consciousness (in some form) in causal processes of quantum mechanics creates an ambiguity because even material causality is convergent with other causalities. Classical physics operates by definition under the assumption that it is explaining mechanisms in material entities (Hooker,1972) , so ambiguities are inevitable if attempts are made to integrate quantum physics into a classical worldview (Bohr, 1958 ) because a material "nature" is no longer available as an independent term (Rosenfeld, 1961) by which to define efficient, final, and formal causes.
Rather than reinterpret quantum theory to minimize the implications of reference to consciousness in efficient causal explanation, many accept the worldview implied in quantum physics and instead reinterpret consciousness, by accepting its participation in creating reality (Walker, 2000; Rosenblum and Kuttner, 2006) . As discussed, efficient causality is ambiguous with respect to consciousness because of causal convergence in the complex system that relates brain to mind. Thus, whether endeavors are undertaken to reinterpret the concept of what constitutes a physical observation or to reinterpret consciousness itself, they eventually encounter parallel "hard problems" of defining ISSN 1303 5150 www.neuroquantology.com 373 (convergent) causality across levels of a complex hierarchy within the topical boundaries of each science (e.g., causally relating quantum reality with macroscopic, classical reality, or mind with brain). Neurobiology tends to presume a "classical" (i.e., efficient) physical causality because the brain exists in the classical realm, in which cause(s) both precede effect(s), and are necessary and sufficient to produce them. This concept of causality has significant explanatory weight when considering "how the brain produces mind". Indeed, the very phrasing of the question explicates that the brain "causes" mentality. Thus, what might appear to be a parallel problem of neuroscience and physics actually becomes one of intersecting issues and dimensions when we consider quantum relationships effected within the classical brain. In this way, any physical portrayal of causality will necessarily impact the understanding of the nature of neurobiological mechanism(s). If we attempt to relate quantum physics to consciousness, then it becomes necessary to elucidate processes of (formal) causality that are operative in, and contributory to efficient, and perhaps final causality at the levels of both the part (i.e., the quantum mechanisms) and whole (i.e., the classical material in which mechanisms are expressed).
This approach is supported by considering the relationship between physics and neuroscience (viz., the study of consciousness), qua science(s). If consciousness is in some way relevant to the "collapse" of a quantum coherence (i.e., the superposition state) state, then it completes a reciprocity between physics and neuroscience, akin to Piaget's "circle of the sciences" which asserts that at the most reduced level, physics becomes logic and mathematics, which are necessarily psychological and therefore mental entities (Brown, 2003) . If neuroscience (and therefore consciousness) and physics are analogously related, then the designation of events as "causes" and "effects" becomes ambiguous "within" the system. If efficient causality is sought, then any explanation is limited to a single descriptive level at which the efficient causal mechanism is discretely apparent. Yet this explanation cannot describe anything more complex than itself, as more complex entities are beyond its reference (Crutchfield, 2008) . Thus, an explanation of efficient cause(s) of the quantum physical dynamics of consciousness (which exists further along a functional hierarchy, somehow emergent from brain) remains inaccessible to the terms currently available to quantum physics, and perhaps even neuroscience. On the other hand, an explanation of formal causality, which by its nature encompasses references internal to a system, and therefore all other (emergent) hierarchical levels, would reflect the reciprocal relationships between physics and neuroscience (through consciousness and/or the function served by observation).
If this formal relationship applies to the sciences themselves, then one cannot say that "physical mechanisms cause the mind" any more conclusively than "the mind causes physical mechanisms," as both simply refer back to each other in the "circle." The hierarchy between the sciences becomes "tangled," in the sense that they become part of a more extensive complex system of Science wherein their reciprocity prevents linear, cause-and-effect descriptions (Goswami, 1993, p.186) , not only of complex phenomena within each science but between the sciences themselves (Brown, 2003) . Therefore, per a "circle of sciences," it is reasonable that an understanding of neuroscience would be as likely to illuminate the nature of physics, as vice versa, given that both involve the process of consciousness, and arise from conscious process itself. This speaks to 1) whether consciousness-neuroscience-physics "exist" as things ("out there" and unto themselves) to be discovered, 2) are constructs that are in some way "formed" as explanatory realities (i.e., created), and 3) questions of what the reality of physics ≈ consciousness ≈ neuroscience "is" (i.e., der Ding an sich). If consciousness were the explanandum, and neuroscience and/or physics the means of explanation, then the explanation would be physical, resulting in an endless loop of reference between explanadum and explanation. However, if this were reversed and consciousness was instead used as the explanation for neuroscience and physics, then the explanation is freed from the a priori ISSN 1303 5150 www.neuroquantology.com 374 requirement that the analogous problems of dualism in neuroscience (qua the study of consciousness) and physics be resolved (Goldberg, 2006, p.63) .
Reduction in Complex Systems (?)
We have argued that in hierarchically complex systems, the lower the hierarchical level, the less distinct causes become. Inasmuch as quantum physics is somehow unified with classical physics, it represents a level of mechanistic description that is lower in the hierarchy, with higher (e.g., classical) effects being described as "emergent" from these lower levels. We opine that this description of the relationship of quantum and classical physics is applicable in describing that of both consciousness and neurobiology, and of physics ≈ consciousness ≈ neuroscience. So, given that the physical brain is a manifestation of physical particles (albeit described at a higher level in the organizational hierarchy), both quantum and classical physical principles likely apply, depending upon the level of explanation. This contextualizes the brain to within a unified (and universal) reality, that can be variably described based upon the specific scale at which a given phenomena is explained. The relevance of (kinds of) causal descriptions should vary in accordance with the differing dynamics and mechanisms that exist in particular non-reductive, lower levels of a hierarchy that manifests emergent properties. However, if there is causal convergence, then both the explanation and the explanandum can only be considered as wholes. In light of this, it is not surprising that scientifically reductive methods have not been able to close the explanatory gaps relevant to hierarchically-entangled, complex system(s). Reductionism cannot explain events that encompass dynamics existing across an emergently higher and more (causally) complex system, because it lacks the epistemic toolbox to do so. Its methods are only equipped for certain kinds of questions that are characteristically reductive and hence only aimed at providing explanations limited to a single level in a complex hierarchy. Because the use of these (linear) tools often require the employment of simplifying assumptions, many of these methods fail to accommodate non-linear properties that are characteristic of more complex explanations (Rauscher, 1998; Corbí and Prades, 2000; Crutchfield, 2008) .
The explanatory elements among levels within a complex hierarchy are often inapplicable between "levels" as they misrepresent both scale and "meaning." This would require "bridge laws" be proposed as empirical hypotheses to connect the terms of one theoretical level ("T") with those of another ("T′") (Nagel, 2008) . The explanation of an inhomogeneous system tends to reference the efficient cause of a given mechanism, whereas the description tends to reference the material cause. In this way, even though material causality may be reducible within inhomogeneous phenomena, efficient causality is not. But even if the explanatory elements of the reducing and reduced terms are inhomogeneous (and thus require correspondence rules), the descriptive elements of the system's components would remain reducible, inasmuch as they are (putatively) physical, and only the "level of description" varies between levels (Nagel, 2008) . For example, it may not be meaningful to describe a biological process such as a digestion in terms of movement of the atoms involved, but it could be done. On the other hand, there is no principle of molecular interactions that can explain the function of a digestion; there is no concept in purely molecular terms that can account for notions of nutrition or systemic homeostasis. An (efficient causal) explanation of function, as it references a system's final and formal cause (e.g., nutrition and systemic homeostasis as final cause(s) of digestion), is necessarily more complex than the description of material cause.
This does not mean that a "true," efficient explanation is impossible or incomprehensible, but rather that such an explanation must be rooted in the most fundamental element(s) of the complex system. Because the fundamental elements of a complex system mediate causally convergent mechanism(s), they must be describable in such a way as to be able to represent each or all of the causal elements. A complex system is best conceived as formal, to allow reference to not only the form, but the purpose and process of the system. On the other hand, a material entity is incapable of referring to all of these at once and therefore the fundamental entity in the universe could not be a (strictly) material entity. Instead, the fundamental element should exist as something ontologically immaterial that, at a given degree of complexity, might assume a material form. This suggests that physical material exists "higher" in a universal complex hierarchy than the fundamental entity, which challenges the assumption that a "physical" universe is fundamentally material.
Even though we may understand that efficient causality is not necessarily distinct in higher-order phenomena, reductive and empirical methodologies-especially when they involve certain simplifications necessary to elicit an explanation restricted enough to be comprehensible-remain rooted in material and efficient causality. Such explanatory methods assume a fundamentally material universe, and therefore problems of dualism arise when we attempt to integrate explanations of the phenomenal (which necessarily include reference to final and formal causes) with material and efficient causalities of the (purely) physical. Because classical physics operates by definition under the assumption that it is explaining mechanisms in material entities, ambiguities are inevitable if attempts are made to integrate quantum physics into a classical worldview because a material "nature" is no longer available as an independent term by which to define efficient, final, and formal causes. Convergence (with other causes) disrupts the hierarchy of causes by preventing material causality from serving as the descriptive link between levels of complexity, as is required for the reduction of an explanation. This was captured by Niels Bohr with, "The notion of an ultimate subject as well as conceptions of realism and idealism finds no place in objective description as we have defined it," (italics added by these authors) a statement which implies an interdependence of physical laws and theories, and ourselves as entities implicitly bound to them. (Kafatos and Nadeau, 1990; Bohr, 1958, p.59) .
Thus, when and where emergence is involved (as is arguable for relationships of brain-mind, and/or quantum and classical physics), the act of observation may affect explanations of causality. Fundamentally indiscrete material causality at the quantum level (from which the classical level is emergent) contributes to the perceived need to interpret how an efficient cause such as "observation" can in effect produce material existence (instead of the other way around). However, this perceived need for interpretation may not be (as) significant outside of reductionism. For example, on one level it is correct to assert that "observation" is the efficient cause of the collapse of quantum coherence, but this poses no conflict with a "greater" (i.e., more complex) worldview such that interpretation is required. This is because this explanation (of observation as an efficient cause) should not be expected to be complete when multiple levels are considered, as the efficient cause of observation in this broader scope encompasses levels of greater complexity than exist at the quantum level alone (i.e., neural dynamics or those of a mechanical measurement device). As argued, reductionism lacks the epistemic tools to simultaneously investigate multiple levels of a complex system because the emphasis on efficient causality requires the fundamental nature of the system to be material. Thus, a more cogent approach to examining causal mechanism in a complex system as a whole would be grounded in a formal, rather than efficient, causality.
Universal Information and Formal Causality
One clue to the form of the complex "whole" of reality is provided by recognizing the reciprocal relationships between consciousness, physics, and neuroscience. If the causal structure of the universe is grounded in formal causality, then the level at which the "circle of sciences" is apparent may be recognized as a hierarchically more complex form that is emergent from the formal dynamics at the fundamental, and presumably quantum, level. Indeed, causal convergence at the lower quantum level reflects the form of the "circle of sciences" in a number of ways. First is entanglement, which akin to the concept of a "tangled" hierarchy exhibits a causal reciprocity wherein linear, cause-andeffect descriptions are not apparent. Another is the uncertainty principle as manifested in complementary quantities; given that ISSN 1303 5150 www.neuroquantology.com 376 complementarity 1) represents one way that measurement tends to affect the system and 2) is due to wave-particle duality, this raises the question of whether things "exist" unto themselves (to be discovered) or are constructs that are in some way "formed" as explanatory realities (i.e., created by measurement). Thus, the fundamental reality of the quantum is immaterial and, inasmuch as it consists only of the form of relationships, is formal. This relates to consciousness in that most theories that entail emergence purport that consciousness arises from the complexity of and in neural system(s). In this way, complexity is part of the explanation for consciousness, and the explanation for this complexity-that which relates its hierarchical levels-is rooted in physical (i.e., material) terms (e.g., complexity of neural networks). Yet emergent complexity cannot be explained in solely material terms: emergence characterizes, and therefore must reference the fundamental form of the system. Accordingly, the formal nature of the complex system, rather than its material nature, relates the levels (of complexity) to both one another, as well as to their collective whole.
Several theories of consciousness, as well as physics, implicitly refer to this notion of reciprocal references within complex hierarchies. These provide examples of how such a formal approach to resolve these paradoxes, as we are proposing, could manifest. Amit Goswami ( The Self Aware Universe, 1993) Consciousness, 2000) all address to the aforementioned paradoxes. Goswami explicitly invokes the concept of "tangled hierarchies" to propose a solution to the problem of brain-mind that may be categorized as monistic idealism (as opposed to the arguably predominant physicalism), and observes that his approach is consistent with the paradoxes of quantum mechanics. Goldberg proposes a definition of "consciousness as information" in such a way that the fundamental element of a universal complex system is consciousness. Lloyd proposes that a functional model for the universe is as a quantum computer, and he too observes the relevance of quantum information theory to consciousness. Walker provides a mathematical structure to unify each of these, by replacing the mass term in Dirac's equation with an information term to explain how consciousness can cause state vector collapse. Importantly, his equation consists of a space-time operator and an information term (described further below), and explicitly requires that "something be observed that we can most simply and symmetrically assume to be of the same form as the observer" (italics added by this author) (Walker, 2000, p.309) .
These four theories have explanations that employ an implicitly common formal causality, through which it becomes possible that consciousness (as information) is both a fundamental form of the universe, as well as that which causes its evolution towards increasing complexity. Moreover, each proposal is well-suited to be integrated with a neuroscientific understanding of brain-mind, complementing each other to collectively supply a formal, material, efficient, and final explanation for both consciousness and physical reality (as subjectively experienced). When considered alongside the Penrose and Hameroff "orchestrated objective reduction" ("Orch OR") theory of quantum neuronal mechanics (Hameroff and Penrose, 1996; Hameroff 2001) , these principles suggest a formal mechanistic causality for brain-mind.
A deeper examination of Goswami's description of the "tangled hierarchies" that result from a system's self-reference (see The Self-Aware Universe, 1993) reveals concepts of causal convergence and formal causality in brain-mind. Goswami illustrates how selfreference causes a tangled hierarchy by invoking the Liar's Paradox. The statement "I am a liar" is paradoxical; if I am telling the truth, I am not a liar, but if I am a liar I must be speaking the truth, and so on. There is a discontinuity in the statement, in that causality in the system is not linear. The discontinuity in tangled hierarchies appears as an illusion of circling causes-andeffects that result from a system referencing itself. Goswami invokes Escher's Print Gallery (1956) for an illustration of this discontinuity (which is visually represented as a blank space in the center of the self-referencing image of the ISSN 1303 5150 www.neuroquantology.com 377 building; for illustration, see http://escherdroste.math.leidenuniv.nl/). Unlike most classical systems, tangled hierarchies do not manifest distinct, efficient causes from within the system; only at an inviolate level can an implicit (e.g., formal) cause be discerned. An inviolate level exists at a point from which the system may be viewed in meta-perspectivewhere a tangled hierarchy (and its essential selfreferential properties) can be recognized without such recognition explicitly contributing to the reciprocal references. For example, a viewer of an Escher drawing exists at an inviolate level to the self-referencing system portrayed.
Goswami connects this "tangled hierarchical" consciousness with physics. He applies quantum mechanics to the brain by considering consciousness (qua neuronal "state vectors") to "collapse" into existence, akin to the collapse of the Schrödinger waveform. In this way the conscious brain-mind references itself, and in so doing collapses the probable states into a classic, measurable neuronal state. From this "state vector collapse" arises the stratification of the (brain-mind) system's organization, characterized by loops whose components are scattered between different levels of a tangled hierarchy. It is as if consciousness collapses into the blank spot in Escher's Print Gallery, both emerging from and consisting of the hierarchy itself. Thus, for Goswami, consciousness is the fundamental form of the universe, which references itself and becomes "real" (Goswami, 1993 ).
Goldberg (2006) also proposed that the form of the fundamental element of a universal complex system is consciousness. His work directly reconciles the physical components and "meaning" components of consciousness, and this emphasis on meaning is integral to aligning the qualitative facets of experience with quantitative physical events. Goldberg's solution to the mind-body problem (and quantum paradox) is based upon the identification of consciousness as information, which "…comes in a broad spectrum, from very simple to very complex" (Goldberg, 2006, p.10) . By identifying consciousness-as-information to be a fundamental element and formal cause of its own increase in complexity, he asks "…how does matter arise from mind?" instead of vice versa (Goldberg, 2006, p.9 ). However, it should be noted that Goldberg uses the term "information" in a slightly different way than it is used in information theory (wherein it is a quantitative term referring to "the minimum number of binary digits necessary to transfer a message" (Goldberg, 2006, p.15) ). Goldberg's definition refers to the qualitative use of information to connote meaning. Accordingly, "if consciousness = information = meaning, then, since information is everywhere and not just in the brain, one would have to ascribe some degree of consciousness…[to] everything in the universe" (Goldberg, 2006, p.52) .
Through this assertion, Goldberg proposes a specific type of panpsychism in which consciousness (as meaningful information) is present in everything, but not to the same degree of complexity as information exists and arises in human consciousness. Meaning (qua consciousness-as-information) arises over "…a sequence of events that occur over a range of space and time" and "is not confined to a specific 'moment' or 'place'" and is instead bound to a "broad span of…time and space." Thus, for Goldberg the consciousness "ascribed to the universe," as well as of human consciousness, consists of "subdivisions, each of which… [with] their own level [of information]" (Goldberg, 2006, p.53) .
Here Goldberg's and Goswami's conceptions of consciousness converge, in the sense that they both posit consciousness to be an essentially complex hierarchy. As identified with the form of a complex hierarchy, consciousness may be said to emerge from, as well as consist of, the hierarchy itself. Consciousness (as experienced) is what is apparent from an "inviolate" level (i.e., we observe that we are conscious), and so attempts to define or explain consciousness (at any other level than formal causality) inevitably engage references to constitutive elements (of consciousness), and thereby devolve into reciprocity and paradox, leaving an "explanatory gap". Yet consciousness, as understood at the "highest" level (i.e., as it is associated with human brain-mind) does exist at "lower" levels but cannot be completely explained using only references intrinsic to that level alone. Given the premises that 1) efficient explanation must be rooted in the most fundamental element of the system, 2) this element accounts for relationships between hierarchical levels, and 3) this must be characterized by formal rather than material causality, we argue that information is a promising framework to define the fundamental basis for both matter and (emergent) consciousness. As a fundamental element of consciousness, information may be quantitatively defined at the most fundamental ("lowest") level of the hierarchy, and may be more qualitatively defined at ascending levels, as these inevitably make increasing and reciprocal references to the other levels, rendering emergent meaning.
It may seem to be a restatement of duality to consider this fundamental information to possess quantitative and qualitative properties, but this is not necessarily so. Regarding the information term to be quantitative is consistent with the requirement that this fundamental element must be characterized by causal convergence(s). Accordingly: 1) its quantum dynamical properties further an increase in complexity (i.e., relating formal and final causes); 2) matter arises from it through the process of complexification (i.e., relating material and final causes); 3) the mechanism of its process can be described as self-referential (i.e., relating efficient and formal causes) and 4) such self-reference is both necessary and sufficient to increase complexity, which can be achieved by collapsing the Schrödinger waveform equation if an information term is introduced (i.e., relating efficient and final causes). Notably, there are reciprocal relationships only among the formal, final, and efficient causes at the fundamental level. The material cause arises from the final cause (by an increase in complexity), akin to how matter arises from an increase in the complexity of quantum information, as described in Lloyd's "universal computer" model of the universe (Lloyd, 2006) . Similarly, (qualitative) meaning may arise from an increase in the complexity of (quantitative) information. Therefore, matter cannot be explained without reciprocal reference between causes and levels of a complex hierarchy. This concept is concretized by Walker's modification of the Dirac equation (Walker, 2000) . To reiterate, consciousness becomes the formal process of a system engaging in and generating the very possibility for self-reference.
We posit that it is not necessary to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative levels and types of information to account for informational involvement in physics and consciousness. The apparent causal convergence that occurs at increasingly higher levels, up to that of the "circle of sciences", reflects the hermeneutic circle, in which an understanding of an entity as a whole can only be known by reference to its parts, but the "function" of the parts is only understood by knowledge of the entity as a whole. This entails elevating the role of context, meaning, and the subsequent importance of an observer or interpreter. Meaning in such a causally convergent system is "captured" by an observer, and forged into the system in the "closure of newness" (Crutchfield, 2008, p.272) . Here the term "observer" may refer either to the consciousness that exists at the hierarchy's "highest" level, or may refer to a level at which the formal cause of the circular relationship is evident. Information may exist as quantitative and qualitative units because they represent interrelated parts of the system that must both explain the system, and be part of the explanandum. The formal cause may be identified with these interrelated parts, making such informational units qualitative, and may also be considered to be emergent from quantitative information (as physical units). Such self-reference obtains a complex hierarchy, rendering meaningful (i.e., qualitative) information emergent from increasingly complex patterns of quantitative information, as the fundamental unit.
Because the hermeneutic circle can be used to describe the relationship between the sciences, a basic, fundamentally quantitative unit-such as information-becomes qualitative (i.e., meaningful) as its complexity increases. This is embodied in quantum information theory, because of a property that allows "…the creation of information from nothing" (Lloyd, 2006, p.118) In this way, the universe is a quantum computer whose generations become increasingly complex, perhaps to the point where information achieves conscious form (Lloyd, 2006) . The mechanics of a quantum computer are based in the first and second laws of thermodynamics that describe the conservation of energy and the increasing tendency for entropy. In the quantum computer model, entropy is "…a measure of the number of bits of unavailable information registered by the atoms and molecules that make up the world" (Lloyd, 2006, p.67) . Quantum computation increases the amount of information contained in a physical system by the "…spreading of ignorance," that is, by increasing entropy. Although this might seem counterintuitive, in quantum computing, information that is condensed into consciousness may actually be a collection of quantum particles carrying information (i.e., "quibits"). Individual quibits are elementary information units which can be represented in discrete binary states, as in classical computing, or can exist indeterminately in both possible states. Unlike the computation of classical units of information ("bit"), the computation of quantum bits, "quibits," has the ability to create information "out of nothing," arising from the quantum mechanical principles of uncertainty and entanglement. Superpositioned quibits compute highly efficiently, with almost unlimited parallel processing power. Computational output is generated by the collapse of superimposed quibits into classic states (Lloyd, 2006) .
How can these quantum particles of information, or "quibits," yield matter, and how can these constitute the basic unit of what is, at its most complex, the consciousness of brainmind? Walker's theory is promising in this attempt. (Due to space constraints, the following is a necessary abbreviation; for a complete explanation with mathematical explication, see Walker, 1988 Walker, , 2000 .) Walker introduces a nonlinear information dispersion term, ΨlogΨ * into Dirac's equation, thereby providing the mechanism for quantum computation without the dual presence of an observer per se. The Greek letter Ψ signifies the collection of possible outcomes of a measurement or physical event, but it is imaginary, only becoming an actual probability when combined with its Hermitian adjoint Ψ * to form ΨΨ * . This new term, referred to as the "consciousness term," ( Ψ logΨ * ) replaces the mass term in Dirac's equation (the relativistic equation that replaces Schroedinger's equation), not only becoming the "source of the masses of particles in physics," but automatically causing the measurement loop to occur (aka "observation"), which leads to state vector collapse (ΨΨ * ). The other term in the modified Dirac equation is a space-time term, and together these two terms compute to yield back the Dirac equation. Simply put, using an information-dispersion term under the assumption (as per Lloyd, Goldberg, and Goswami) that "…only that conscious observation exists, that alone is enough to let us understand where space-time and matter come from" (Walker, 2000, p.308) . In essence, this theory allows for information to preempt mass.
Conclusion Implications for the Future of Physics and Neuroscience
It is now apparent how the form of reality fits in, encompassing brain-mind and physics. A basic quantum unit of information may provide the substrate for a "universal quantum computer," which becomes increasingly complex. A dimensional increase in complexity yields the material universe, which itself increases in complexity until a new dimension in physical complexity emerges-consciousness. Our experience of consciousness is the very formal cause of consciousness in its present state of complexity and may be thought of as Goswami conceives of it-an act of self-reference which collapses the state of self (Goswami, 1993) . It is almost intuitive at this level to visualize the aforementioned causal convergence as a grand loop where consciousness at its most basic form (a quibit of information) ultimately exists in the same form as human qualia, albeit at a much lower degree of complexity, where the formal cause (consciousness-as-information) is also the final cause, the efficient cause, and thereafter the material cause.
Yet a complete efficient causal explanation of brain-mind is not feasible, because it would be as detailed as all the interactions of all the infinite quibits, which actually represent formal units of uncertainty as opposed to material quanta (Lloyd, 2006) , and material terms are arguably the only language available to us (Kafatos and Nadeau, 1990) . On the other hand, we can formulate explanations at the material, final, and efficient causal levels for phenomena existing at lesser degrees of complexity because these may be posited without reference to formal cause due to their fractionated existence. This is analogous to the notion that each science can be self-contained or autonomous (for example, wherein an account of digestion need not invoke quarks). However, as a formal basis for reality (both experienced and fundamental), consciousness (both as human experience and quibits) cannot be explained except by formal causality, and this necessitates consideration of causal convergence and complexity. The same may ultimately be postulated for physics; a unifying theory must be formal, formulating macrophysical concepts in such a way as to reflect the fundamental form at the least complex level of description. For both brain-mind and physics, this is only possible if the explanation-not only explanandum-is immaterial.
If consciousness is a fundamental form of reality, then the potential for neuroscience to elucidate brain-mind dynamics may bear utility for the elucidation of a unifying theory in physics. However, as cautioned by Kafatos and Nadeau (1990) , it is not sufficient to predicate this on the preposition that "…the human brain evolved in a quantum mechanical universe, and reflects, therefore, in its constructions of reality… fundamental dynamics of the life of the universe" (p.137). For this cross-reference between physics and neuroscience to be of any utility, there must be a demonstration of these principles at work in the brain. We may, at present, be limited in this endeavor, but recent developments in systems and computational neuroscience present an avenue with which to move forward. To this end, understanding of the fundamental units is key; it is necessary to elucidate how neurons and neuronal systems might function as complex representations of fundamental units of information. At this degree of complexity within a universal hierarchy, material quanta may certainly and validly apply, which renders the challenge understanding how information is represented in neural systems at multiple levels of complexity, from the fundamental properties of proteins up to and including the binding problem. Physics, then, encounters an opportunity to utilize neuroscience's methodologies and models, particularly advances in computational modeling, as a toolbox and/or model for drawing analogous conclusions regarding the unification of elemental laws.
As the applications of information theory to the brain and models of cognition are better understood, they will likely increase in complexity as they approach the level of complexity of their explanandum. In the process, it may be inevitable that principles be discovered that could guide an understanding of how the complexification of information itself occurs, and further, how it is represented at higher levels of a hierarchy. This, in turn, may pose tremendous advantages if it is translatable to physics and its understanding of information at both quantum and classical levels, especially if it may contribute to a more unified understanding of the universe by physics. The brain and neural models are arguably more accessible to scientists than is the vast universe itself, and mathematical innovation in the field of computational neuroscience may prove applicable to physics. In this way, just as consciousness links the sciences in a circular relationship, its study may link the discoveries of neuroscience to progress in physics. This is one of many consequences of the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of the sciences, a trend that implicitly acknowledges the formal relationship between them. Such progress is not without acknowledged impasse. In neurobiology, developmental and computational models are increasingly useful for portraying systems effects from the genetic to the cognitive levels (e.g. epigenetics, neural networks, conceptual binding, and functional segregation and integration). Yet, like physics, their progression hinges upon theoretical and mathematical advances in understanding complex and nonlinear relationships. In physics too, conceptual advances have historically followed those in mathematical description(s) (Smolin, 2006) . Perhaps what is needed is not just new testable theories, but a new formal conception of the physical universe.
Arguably, attempts to integrate quantum information theory might lead to such revisions (Smolin, 2006) . Scientific approaches that do not require a material basis for the universe-and are therefore free to consider causality beyond that which is efficientrepresent at lease one massive departure from reductionism and material physicalism. Investigating such approaches becomes accessible when one considers that the interdependent relationships between the sciences also apply within the sciences. Nonreductive neuroscientific experiments could be proposed that might develop the theory and implicate greater universal principles. Studies of neuronal self-organization and consciousness might serve as an appropriate junction at which neuroscience can inform physics. Such an investigative approach has the potential not only to elucidate the formal relationship between brain and mind, but also mind and the universe.
